Writing for Bridges Trade BioRes of the International Centre for trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Tara Laan below, provides an opinion on the ‘high Cost of Cheap (fossil fuel) energy’ provided buy subsidies in Russia, with implications for sustainable development.
Subsidies might be a solution to the current situation of escalating cost of petroleum products in Uganda and elsewhere in Africa. Can fuel subsidies be a solution to spur growth in the South? What other options exist to counter the escalating fuel prices that in turn determine even access to basin necessities like food (due to high transport costs)?
Tara’s opinion though based on the Russian experiences reflect the situation and the long-term visions of many countries in the South, and the hard choices they may have to make in the short and long run.
………………………………
By Tara Laan
Russia provides some of the largest subsidies for fossil-fuels in the world. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that Russian subsidies for the consumption of fossil-fuels totalled almost US$34 billion in 2009. Russia is not alone in reducing the prices of fuels for its citizens. The IEA estimated that in 2009 global consumer subsidies for fossil fuels totalled US$312 billion (see graph). These estimates do not include subsidies to fossil-fuel producers, which may be another US$100 billion per year globally.
Russia’s fossil fuel subsidies are concentrated around natural gas and electricity (most of which is produced from gas) as consumer prices for oil products and coal have not been subsidised since the 1990s. Russia is the world’s largest producer of natural gas, the largest exporter and the biggest reserve holder. After the United States, China, and Japan, Russia is the world’s fourth largest electricity producer. Both gas and electricity are sold within Russia at average prices that are well below international market prices. This “price gap” between domestic and international prices was estimated to be approximately US$19 billion for gas and US$15 billion for electricity in 2009: equivalent to US$238 per person and 2.7 percent of GDP, according to IEA estimates. Fossil-fuel consumption was subsidised at an average rate of 23 percent, meaning that consumers paid 77 percent of the full economic cost of energy prices.
This sounds like good news for the Russian people, especially poorer households. But appearances can be deceptive. Energy subsidies actually hold back economic development and are not an effective way to help the poor, not to mention the adverse environmental impacts.
Looking at the social impacts first, studies have found that energy subsidies tend to disproportionately benefit the middle-class and rich. This is because energy subsidies are not usually income tested but provided per unit of energy consumed. There is a strong correlation between wealth and energy consumption. Therefore those consuming more energy receive more of the benefits. A more effective way to help the poor would be to sell energy at market prices and use the revenue (US$34 billion in the case of Russia in 2009) to provide direct assistance to those most in need. This could be delivered through the social safety net as cash payments or through increased spending on social services such as health, education and housing.
From an economic perspective, subsidies artificially reduce prices thus encouraging higher consumption and discouraging investment in new energy infrastructure and efficiency measures. Russia scores poorly compared with other countries in converting its energy resources into economic growth. For example, Russian gas consumption per capita is similar to Canada but consumption per unit of GDP is roughly five times higher than IEA countries. The inefficient use of energy hastens resource depletion and reduces the amount of energy available for export, thereby reducing government revenues available for social programs and infrastructure.
Low prices have also meant that there has been little incentive for energy suppliers to invest in new production or distribution infrastructure, due to the prospect of low financial returns. As a result, Solanko finds that Russian communities have suffered from electricity shortages and there have been large energy losses from an unreliable and inefficient electricity grid. In the gas sector, under-investment has hindered the development of new gas production and distribution infrastructure such as pipelines and transportation, which has put a break on economic development.
The other logical consequence of higher consumption is greater greenhouse-gas emissions and local air pollution. The IEA estimates that phasing out global consumption subsidies for fossil fuels between 2011 and 2020 could cut global CO2 emissions by 5.8 percent compared with a “business as usual” scenario. The OECD estimates that emissions reductions could be as high as 10 percent by 2050 if the same subsidies for fossil-fuel consumption are removed by 2020. Eliminating fossil-fuel subsidies provides a way for countries like Russia to make a major contribution to greenhouse gas reduction without introducing carbon taxes or an emissions trading system.
Subsidies also undermine the incentive to invest in existing cleaner energy sources and technologies by artificially reducing the consumer price for fossil-fuel products. In the same way, energy subsidies discourage innovation in the production and deployment of cleaner types of energy, such as renewables.
The Government of Russia recognises these negative impacts of subsidies and has embarked on a program of bringing gas and electricity prices up to market levels. Gas prices are being gradually increased towards the prices charged to European importers (minus export taxes and transport costs). This process is due to be completed in 2014. According to Solenko, from January 2011, all electricity purchased from the wholesale market for industrial purposes will be at market prices.
But the liberalisation program is far from comprehensive. Household electricity will continue to be cross-subsidised by industry until at least 2014 (Solenko, 2011). Household consumption is 10 percent to 15 percent of total electricity consumption. There also remains significant government ownership in the gas and electricity sector. Gazprom, a state-controlled company, accounts for over 60 percent of Russian reserves and almost 85 percent of Russian production, according to Simmons and Murray. Gazprom owns the Russian gas pipeline system and has a legal monopoly on gas exports. The state is also a major owner of power generation. Three state-owned companies control over one third of power generation capacities. If pricing from state-controlled Gazprom assets are also taken into consideration, Solenko estimates that over half of the electricity generation in Russia remains state-controlled.
Continuing government ownership and control over energy resources may prevent competition and under-pricing could contribute to on-going inefficiency and under-investment. The chief economist of Fortum, a Finnish company with significant investments in power generation and district heating in Russia, commented that subsidies for heating and household electricity remained an impediment to the operation of efficient markets in Russia.
While eliminating gas and electricity subsidies will clearly deliver economic and environmental benefits, it remains true that poorer households will find it difficult to cope with the higher prices. In a survey conducted in 2006, 57 percent of respondents in Russia indicated that higher utility bills had had a significant impact on their lives. For households that depend on subsidies to make energy affordable, energy price rises and possible inflation can put poor households under severe financial stress.
But subsidy reform can be designed and implemented in a way that minimises the negative impacts for poor households. A suite of policies have been used by countries around the world to ease the transition away from energy subsidies. The government can use the revenue gained from subsidies (that are mostly harnessed by the middle class and rich) to those vulnerable to energy poverty. As discussed earlier, this can be delivered through the tax system, social payments, cash transfers, or increased social spending.
The way in which subsidies are eliminated can also ease the transition to market prices and build public support for reform. Best practice includes a clear communications campaign to articulate the benefits of reform, stakeholder consultation, transparency about energy prices, a gradual phase-out of subsidies, and monitoring of the impacts of implementation with adjustments if necessary.
Energy subsidies have played an important role in Russia’s past as a way to make energy affordable for industrial and residential consumers. But subsidies are a blunt instrument for delivering support and they cause market distortions that-ironically-lead to energy shortages and waste. Greater efficiency in the sector will help Russia maximise its economic gain from its vast energy resources, so long as policies are in place to ease the transition away from subsidies particularly programs to help those vulnerable to higher energy prices.
Source
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
Sunday, July 10, 2011
Africa Analysis: Regional climate plan deserves support
A new southern African climate plan is impressive, but needs more funding if it is to plug the continent's data gap, writes Linda Nordling in Science and Development Network.
Africa's rain-fed agriculture and high poverty levels mean it can’t roll with the punches of an unpredictable climate.
But detailed studies on how climate change might affect areas of Africa are often thwarted by a lack of climate data.
Now the continent's southern countries have agreed a plan to strengthen climate data collection and interpretation in the region. And the global climate summit to be held in South Africa in December is a great opportunity to raise funds to put the plan into action.
A regional first
The Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) Implementation Framework to Support Climate Change Response was adopted by the region's science ministers in May.
It sets out how SADC's 15 member states will collect and share climate information, and coordinate their scientific response to the threat of climate change.
Other African regions — such as the East African Community — are working on joint policies to address climate change. But SADC's is set to become the first transnational framework on climate change that is specific to science, the SADC secretariat says.
Africa is short of the data it needs to understand its specific climate trends and build reliable models to anticipate the impacts of climate change.
The density of meteorological stations is about eight times lower than the minimum recommended by the World Meteorological Organization.
According to Chinwe Ifejika Speranza, a researcher from the Centre for Development and Environment in Bern, Switzerland, investment in equipment and personnel is patchy across Africa and measurements are rare in rural regions, where predictions are particularly important for agriculture.
The data gap also affects the credibility and use of existing information in decisions, undermining the continent's attempts to mitigate climate change and plan for its impacts.
Mapping the risks
The SADC document describes activities in four areas where STI is crucial to tackling climate change: observation and monitoring; impacts, vulnerability and risks; mitigation; and adaptation.
Under the first area, countries in the region will audit existing climate data — a five-year exercise that will include integrating archived data and regularly collecting new data. Based on this audit, the network of meteorological stations will be expanded where needed.
The plan also focuses on identifying sectors vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including producing a vulnerability atlas identifying areas at increased risk of flooding or drought.
Under mitigation, the framework will audit carbon-offset projects in the SADC region and fund research to test ways of quantifying their carbon removal potential. Biofuels will be investigated as a way of cutting dependence on fossil fuels.
Finally, the adaptation strategy includes developing a portfolio of green technology projects, as well as research into disease-resistant and stress-tolerant crops.
A positive reception
The plan has received mostly good reviews by the region's scientists.
Phoebe Barnard, climate and biodiversity scientist at the South African National Biodiversity Institute, is glad it provides for more climate observation equipment.
"This ... has been a constant source of weakness in developing accurate climate projections for the region. In Namibia, for instance, there are only a handful of meteorological stations with long-term records of much depth and accuracy," she says.
Bruce Hewitson, from the University of Cape Town's Climate Systems Analysis Group, agrees the plan is good news. "[It] has some exceptionally positive elements, most notably the intention to consolidate the observational record and network which has for a long time constrained the research on regional climate dynamics."
But he is concerned that the plan overlooks training the people needed to expand climate data gathering and analysis. The region's small group of climate scientists is already stretched.
The plan has admirable objectives, says Hewitson, but doesn't identify some implicit challenges. For example, there is a danger of underestimating the challenge of packaging climate information for policymakers. "In practice the development of actionable information is not simply one of running some procedures to generate numbers."
A plea to donors
The plan is ambitious, and the political backing for it means the region is taking climate science seriously. But who will foot the bill?
The document does not identify the cost of the projects. But some money has already been committed. The South African government is sponsoring the programme to the tune of 1.5 million South African rand (around US$220,000), matched by the Australian government.
This is unlikely to support all planned activities, but funding will also come from SADC governments — not least by the countries' realigning of their research funding with the framework.
SADC is also seeking donor funding. In a meeting hosted by South Africa's Department for Science and Technology last month (29 June), the plan was presented to 17 development partners.
The framework comes too late to bear fruit with new data by December, when South Africa hosts the annual international climate summit COP 17 in Durban. A better understanding of the region's climate would improve the chances of influencing global carbon-cutting targets in its favour.
However, southern Africa can and should use the spotlight that will shine on the region in the lead-up to the summit to highlight the climate data gap and lobby for funding to plug it. Despite its shortcomings, the region's climate science framework is a great blueprint, and it deserves support
Source
Africa's rain-fed agriculture and high poverty levels mean it can’t roll with the punches of an unpredictable climate.
But detailed studies on how climate change might affect areas of Africa are often thwarted by a lack of climate data.
Now the continent's southern countries have agreed a plan to strengthen climate data collection and interpretation in the region. And the global climate summit to be held in South Africa in December is a great opportunity to raise funds to put the plan into action.
A regional first
The Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) Implementation Framework to Support Climate Change Response was adopted by the region's science ministers in May.
It sets out how SADC's 15 member states will collect and share climate information, and coordinate their scientific response to the threat of climate change.
Other African regions — such as the East African Community — are working on joint policies to address climate change. But SADC's is set to become the first transnational framework on climate change that is specific to science, the SADC secretariat says.
Africa is short of the data it needs to understand its specific climate trends and build reliable models to anticipate the impacts of climate change.
The density of meteorological stations is about eight times lower than the minimum recommended by the World Meteorological Organization.
According to Chinwe Ifejika Speranza, a researcher from the Centre for Development and Environment in Bern, Switzerland, investment in equipment and personnel is patchy across Africa and measurements are rare in rural regions, where predictions are particularly important for agriculture.
The data gap also affects the credibility and use of existing information in decisions, undermining the continent's attempts to mitigate climate change and plan for its impacts.
Mapping the risks
The SADC document describes activities in four areas where STI is crucial to tackling climate change: observation and monitoring; impacts, vulnerability and risks; mitigation; and adaptation.
Under the first area, countries in the region will audit existing climate data — a five-year exercise that will include integrating archived data and regularly collecting new data. Based on this audit, the network of meteorological stations will be expanded where needed.
The plan also focuses on identifying sectors vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, including producing a vulnerability atlas identifying areas at increased risk of flooding or drought.
Under mitigation, the framework will audit carbon-offset projects in the SADC region and fund research to test ways of quantifying their carbon removal potential. Biofuels will be investigated as a way of cutting dependence on fossil fuels.
Finally, the adaptation strategy includes developing a portfolio of green technology projects, as well as research into disease-resistant and stress-tolerant crops.
A positive reception
The plan has received mostly good reviews by the region's scientists.
Phoebe Barnard, climate and biodiversity scientist at the South African National Biodiversity Institute, is glad it provides for more climate observation equipment.
"This ... has been a constant source of weakness in developing accurate climate projections for the region. In Namibia, for instance, there are only a handful of meteorological stations with long-term records of much depth and accuracy," she says.
Bruce Hewitson, from the University of Cape Town's Climate Systems Analysis Group, agrees the plan is good news. "[It] has some exceptionally positive elements, most notably the intention to consolidate the observational record and network which has for a long time constrained the research on regional climate dynamics."
But he is concerned that the plan overlooks training the people needed to expand climate data gathering and analysis. The region's small group of climate scientists is already stretched.
The plan has admirable objectives, says Hewitson, but doesn't identify some implicit challenges. For example, there is a danger of underestimating the challenge of packaging climate information for policymakers. "In practice the development of actionable information is not simply one of running some procedures to generate numbers."
A plea to donors
The plan is ambitious, and the political backing for it means the region is taking climate science seriously. But who will foot the bill?
The document does not identify the cost of the projects. But some money has already been committed. The South African government is sponsoring the programme to the tune of 1.5 million South African rand (around US$220,000), matched by the Australian government.
This is unlikely to support all planned activities, but funding will also come from SADC governments — not least by the countries' realigning of their research funding with the framework.
SADC is also seeking donor funding. In a meeting hosted by South Africa's Department for Science and Technology last month (29 June), the plan was presented to 17 development partners.
The framework comes too late to bear fruit with new data by December, when South Africa hosts the annual international climate summit COP 17 in Durban. A better understanding of the region's climate would improve the chances of influencing global carbon-cutting targets in its favour.
However, southern Africa can and should use the spotlight that will shine on the region in the lead-up to the summit to highlight the climate data gap and lobby for funding to plug it. Despite its shortcomings, the region's climate science framework is a great blueprint, and it deserves support
Source
Wednesday, July 6, 2011
Prospects for Rio Plus 20?
By Peter M. Haas, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
The Rio Plus 20 Conference (or Summit) is scheduled to be held on 4-6 June 2012 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It is being described within UN circles as the last policy opportunity for promoting green governance and institutional reform. Unfortunately the political climate does not seem favorably disposed towards supporting the ambitious goals of advancing a “green economy” as provisionally laid out in the Conference agenda.
Lessons from the past are not comforting.
Prior successful large scale international environmental conferences – such as Stockholm 1972 and Rio 1992- enjoyed public support, a well-developed agenda with deliverable treaties and policy proposals, and the absence of major power political cleavages.
Past successful technological transformations akin to the green economy – such as the Industrial Revolution in early 19th century England, the spread of free trade in the 1870s, and the reconstruction of Europe and the world economy in the aftermath of World War II – rested on a widely shared common purpose, political support by a transnational network of influential actors, and strong treaty obligations and international organizations capable of coordinating national policies.
None of these broad set of political preconditions for success appear to be present yet for Rio Plus 20. Governments and publics are preoccupied by the Arab Spring, restoring financial health, the war in Afghanistan, and terrorism.
The ‘green economy’ concept remains contested. Beyond the problem of defining a ‘green economy ‘, countries will compete over access to the commanding heights of the new economy, and thus are divided on their anticipated benefits from it. Some governments support the green economy approach, anticipating that their economies may benefit from a new epoch of green technology: including Japan, S. Korea, Germany, China, and possibly Brazil. Others are ambivalent – such as the USA and Russia – in large part because of the divided nature of their industrial sector which continues to rely heavily on fossil fuels and on manufacturing products for the older technology. Still others, including many in the developing world, are fearful that new technologies will be more competitive than their exports, that they may not enjoy cheap access to the new technologies, and that they may not contribute to job creation in their societies.
Green markets are still immature. The various green sectors remain too small in their respective countries to be able to command significant political clout. International institutions, and in particular the envisioned reforms so far discussed in the Rio Plus 20 preparatory process are insufficiently bold to be able to sway governments to change their dominant economic policy paradigms.
The Conference planners are thus faced with a dilemma, and few realistic options. The dilemma is that bold action requires more political support than is presently available. The challenge is how, with less than a year, and realistically more like 8 months, can sufficient political support be created to induce governmental support for developing a serious road-map for a green economy?
What options are available to claim a success at the conference?
- One option of course is to recognize bleak political realities, and delay the
conference until the political climate appears more felicitous.
- Another option is to try to change those realities by building the
domestic support for the conference, through efforts to mobilize green sectors
worldwide.
- A third option is to plan for the day after the conference, and develop
conference outputs that will continue to advance the longer process towards
Sustainable Development and a green economy from June 7th.
Source
The Rio Plus 20 Conference (or Summit) is scheduled to be held on 4-6 June 2012 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It is being described within UN circles as the last policy opportunity for promoting green governance and institutional reform. Unfortunately the political climate does not seem favorably disposed towards supporting the ambitious goals of advancing a “green economy” as provisionally laid out in the Conference agenda.
Lessons from the past are not comforting.
Prior successful large scale international environmental conferences – such as Stockholm 1972 and Rio 1992- enjoyed public support, a well-developed agenda with deliverable treaties and policy proposals, and the absence of major power political cleavages.
Past successful technological transformations akin to the green economy – such as the Industrial Revolution in early 19th century England, the spread of free trade in the 1870s, and the reconstruction of Europe and the world economy in the aftermath of World War II – rested on a widely shared common purpose, political support by a transnational network of influential actors, and strong treaty obligations and international organizations capable of coordinating national policies.
None of these broad set of political preconditions for success appear to be present yet for Rio Plus 20. Governments and publics are preoccupied by the Arab Spring, restoring financial health, the war in Afghanistan, and terrorism.
The ‘green economy’ concept remains contested. Beyond the problem of defining a ‘green economy ‘, countries will compete over access to the commanding heights of the new economy, and thus are divided on their anticipated benefits from it. Some governments support the green economy approach, anticipating that their economies may benefit from a new epoch of green technology: including Japan, S. Korea, Germany, China, and possibly Brazil. Others are ambivalent – such as the USA and Russia – in large part because of the divided nature of their industrial sector which continues to rely heavily on fossil fuels and on manufacturing products for the older technology. Still others, including many in the developing world, are fearful that new technologies will be more competitive than their exports, that they may not enjoy cheap access to the new technologies, and that they may not contribute to job creation in their societies.
Green markets are still immature. The various green sectors remain too small in their respective countries to be able to command significant political clout. International institutions, and in particular the envisioned reforms so far discussed in the Rio Plus 20 preparatory process are insufficiently bold to be able to sway governments to change their dominant economic policy paradigms.
The Conference planners are thus faced with a dilemma, and few realistic options. The dilemma is that bold action requires more political support than is presently available. The challenge is how, with less than a year, and realistically more like 8 months, can sufficient political support be created to induce governmental support for developing a serious road-map for a green economy?
What options are available to claim a success at the conference?
- One option of course is to recognize bleak political realities, and delay the
conference until the political climate appears more felicitous.
- Another option is to try to change those realities by building the
domestic support for the conference, through efforts to mobilize green sectors
worldwide.
- A third option is to plan for the day after the conference, and develop
conference outputs that will continue to advance the longer process towards
Sustainable Development and a green economy from June 7th.
Source
Friday, July 1, 2011
Tanzania’s burning question: Can REDD succeed amid a charcoal addiction?
By Salla Rantala
Driving along a narrow country road leading towards the Rubeho mountains in Central Tanzania’s Kilosa district, we come across bicycle after bicycle loaded with sacks of charcoal, heading towards sprawling urban centres.
Two weeks later, I write this to the loud churning sound of the diesel generator of our compound in Dar es Salaam, during another one of the programmed 16-hour power cuts across the city. The links between the two situations are multiple, with a number of implications for the success of a national initiative of mitigating climate change through reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.
Over 90% of Tanzanians depend on wood fuels for domestic energy, and in the urban centers, charcoal is the fuel of choice. In Dar es Salaam, the proportion of households using charcoal as the primary source energy arose from 47% to 71% between 2002-2007. It is a reliable source of energy – unlike electricity – and does not require expensive appliances to use it.
On May 23rd 2011, in an event celebrating three years of climate change partnership between the governments of Tanzania and Norway, the Environment Minister of Tanzania, Terezya Huvisa, posed a question to the audience: how many of you do not use charcoal when cooking at home? Only three people out of the 50+ participants, consisting largely of urbanite government officials and donor and NGO representatives in the forestry sector, raised their hands. The myth of wood fuel as primarily the energy source of the poor and the rural was definitely debunked. Even those battling deforestation in the policy arenas are using it.
Policy discussions around forests and climate change frequently refer to charcoal production as one of the main culprits of deforestation and forest carbon emissions. This is explicitly articulated in the Tanzanian Draft National Strategy for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) published in January 2011. Future “business as usual” scenarios predict a worsening of the situation.
The demand for charcoal is projected to increase along with rapid urbanization and population growth. A recent study describes a deforestation ring expanding around Dar es Salaam in waves, the outer boundary of the charcoal production area having moved 30 km between 1991 and 2005 (2 km/y). As nearby forests are exhausted, increasing charcoal prices (from less than 3,000 Tanzanian shillings/sack in 2003 to over TZS 20,000/sack in 2007) offset the cost of transporting the product longer distances, and the boundary is pushed further.
The consequences of deforestation and forest degradation extend beyond CO2 emissions. In terms of environmental services, they include biodiversity losses and decreased water services. The inhabitants of Tanzanian cities have become accustomed to intermittent power cuts as water levels in the hydroelectric dams, which supply most of the country’s electricity, fall under comfortable levels. While citizens complain, then submissively shrug at the inconvenience, prolonged power rationing adversely affects especially small- and medium-sized businesses and causes economic losses.
The proposed measures to counter the charcoal driver of deforestation in the draft National REDD+ Strategy include supporting access to alternative energy sources and increasing the efficiency of both biomass energy production and utilization. Civil society actors commend the latter measure as a step forward from the idea of an overnight transformation of the whole energy sector by a complete abandoning of biomass fuels.
This “quick fix” solution has tended to dominate the public energy discourse in Tanzania, although deemed unrealistic by an increasing number of stakeholders. Yet, the broader political economy ramifications of the charcoal challenge are vaguely analyzed and not explicitly addressed in the national policy proposals.
The multi-billion Tanzania shilling charcoal economy is largely unregulated, and escapes government tax collectors. Most of the charcoal is derived from lands with contested tenure. As in many other sub-Saharan countries, in Tanzania there has been a push towards decentralized natural resource governance and devolution of forest rights to local communities since 1990s.
Yet in practice, skewed interpretation of laws by government officials undermines tenure by communities and individuals, who then have little incentive to sustainably manage their resources. Charcoal production is often the byproduct of clearing more land for agriculture – another frequently cited driver of deforestation. In Iringa region in central Tanzania, villages engage in sustainable community-based charcoal production.
The sustainable charcoal, however, has to compete in the market with illegal, unregulated charcoal, the cheaper price of which does not reflect the full value of the product with the raw material costs excluded. In addition, the shares from illegal charcoal that remain with local producers are a fraction of the final market price. The trade is dominated by a narrow band of powerful elites.
Empowering communities to access charcoal levies might enhance incentives for local enforcement, but it would also mean decreased revenue to central and district governments. Bringing the charcoal business under regulation and changing the current status quo would therefore require considerable political will.
There is a broad consensus among policy actors in Tanzania that it is crucial to address the charcoal question for REDD+ policies to be effective. But with the REDD+ discussion largely compartmentalized inside the forest sector, do they have the will and the adequate means to act on it?
Source
Driving along a narrow country road leading towards the Rubeho mountains in Central Tanzania’s Kilosa district, we come across bicycle after bicycle loaded with sacks of charcoal, heading towards sprawling urban centres.
Two weeks later, I write this to the loud churning sound of the diesel generator of our compound in Dar es Salaam, during another one of the programmed 16-hour power cuts across the city. The links between the two situations are multiple, with a number of implications for the success of a national initiative of mitigating climate change through reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.
Over 90% of Tanzanians depend on wood fuels for domestic energy, and in the urban centers, charcoal is the fuel of choice. In Dar es Salaam, the proportion of households using charcoal as the primary source energy arose from 47% to 71% between 2002-2007. It is a reliable source of energy – unlike electricity – and does not require expensive appliances to use it.
On May 23rd 2011, in an event celebrating three years of climate change partnership between the governments of Tanzania and Norway, the Environment Minister of Tanzania, Terezya Huvisa, posed a question to the audience: how many of you do not use charcoal when cooking at home? Only three people out of the 50+ participants, consisting largely of urbanite government officials and donor and NGO representatives in the forestry sector, raised their hands. The myth of wood fuel as primarily the energy source of the poor and the rural was definitely debunked. Even those battling deforestation in the policy arenas are using it.
Policy discussions around forests and climate change frequently refer to charcoal production as one of the main culprits of deforestation and forest carbon emissions. This is explicitly articulated in the Tanzanian Draft National Strategy for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) published in January 2011. Future “business as usual” scenarios predict a worsening of the situation.
The demand for charcoal is projected to increase along with rapid urbanization and population growth. A recent study describes a deforestation ring expanding around Dar es Salaam in waves, the outer boundary of the charcoal production area having moved 30 km between 1991 and 2005 (2 km/y). As nearby forests are exhausted, increasing charcoal prices (from less than 3,000 Tanzanian shillings/sack in 2003 to over TZS 20,000/sack in 2007) offset the cost of transporting the product longer distances, and the boundary is pushed further.
The consequences of deforestation and forest degradation extend beyond CO2 emissions. In terms of environmental services, they include biodiversity losses and decreased water services. The inhabitants of Tanzanian cities have become accustomed to intermittent power cuts as water levels in the hydroelectric dams, which supply most of the country’s electricity, fall under comfortable levels. While citizens complain, then submissively shrug at the inconvenience, prolonged power rationing adversely affects especially small- and medium-sized businesses and causes economic losses.
The proposed measures to counter the charcoal driver of deforestation in the draft National REDD+ Strategy include supporting access to alternative energy sources and increasing the efficiency of both biomass energy production and utilization. Civil society actors commend the latter measure as a step forward from the idea of an overnight transformation of the whole energy sector by a complete abandoning of biomass fuels.
This “quick fix” solution has tended to dominate the public energy discourse in Tanzania, although deemed unrealistic by an increasing number of stakeholders. Yet, the broader political economy ramifications of the charcoal challenge are vaguely analyzed and not explicitly addressed in the national policy proposals.
The multi-billion Tanzania shilling charcoal economy is largely unregulated, and escapes government tax collectors. Most of the charcoal is derived from lands with contested tenure. As in many other sub-Saharan countries, in Tanzania there has been a push towards decentralized natural resource governance and devolution of forest rights to local communities since 1990s.
Yet in practice, skewed interpretation of laws by government officials undermines tenure by communities and individuals, who then have little incentive to sustainably manage their resources. Charcoal production is often the byproduct of clearing more land for agriculture – another frequently cited driver of deforestation. In Iringa region in central Tanzania, villages engage in sustainable community-based charcoal production.
The sustainable charcoal, however, has to compete in the market with illegal, unregulated charcoal, the cheaper price of which does not reflect the full value of the product with the raw material costs excluded. In addition, the shares from illegal charcoal that remain with local producers are a fraction of the final market price. The trade is dominated by a narrow band of powerful elites.
Empowering communities to access charcoal levies might enhance incentives for local enforcement, but it would also mean decreased revenue to central and district governments. Bringing the charcoal business under regulation and changing the current status quo would therefore require considerable political will.
There is a broad consensus among policy actors in Tanzania that it is crucial to address the charcoal question for REDD+ policies to be effective. But with the REDD+ discussion largely compartmentalized inside the forest sector, do they have the will and the adequate means to act on it?
Source
Thursday, June 30, 2011
Central Kenya farmers turn to solar irrigation
Farmers in Central Kenya are embracing solar technology as an environmentally friendly and cost-effective way to irrigate their land.
Joseph Mutua has begun using a solar-powered pump to bring water from the nearby Nyamindi River to irrigate his export-bound food crops, which include French beans, baby corn and kale.
Solar panels standing on tall metal poles are connected to a pump immersed in the river, 200 metres away. A pipe carries water from the pump to a storage tank at the farm, and from there it is directed through pipes to irrigate Mutua’s farmland.
Farmers generally use diesel or petrol engines to pump water, but increases in the price of oil are making these pumps increasingly expensive to run.
"A farmer using a diesel pump spends up to 5,000 Kenyan shillings a day (about $60) to pump water to a medium piece of land," Mutua said.
By contrast, the solar pump, once purchased and installed, costs nothing to run. That enables farmers to spend their money on things like seeds instead of irrigation, Mutua said.
"For over a year now since I bought the solar pump, I have not had any maintenance. It has really saved me a lot of money," said Mutua.
NOT CHEAP, BUT CLEAN
The pump is not cheap. A solar pump with eight panels costs around 1.2 million shillings (about $14,000). Mutua started with the smallest possible unit – two solar panels – which, together with a tank and irrigation pipes, enabled him to irrigate 0.2 hectares (half an acre) of vegetables.
The initial cost was 170,000 shillings (about $1,900), which he paid out of his farming income and from savings.
In addition to its minimal running costs, the solar technology is environmentally clean. Unlike diesel engines, the solar-powered pump emits no pollution or climate changing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.
The pump also is helping to conserve water from the Nayamindi river. Low rainfall, likely caused by climatic change, is causing the river to dry up at certain times of year.
In drought-prone areas of Kenya, irrigation is widely used in farming. But uncontrolled irrigation methods, such as flooding furrows with water and letting it soak into the soil, are endangering water supplies.
"Every drop of water matters. Twenty years from now, if we don't keep our environment safe, we shall perish," warned Edwin Munge, a regional agronomist in Kirinyaga district.
Munge works with Kenya Horticultural Exporters, a local company to which Joseph Mutua sells his French beans. Munge is helping small-scale farmers such as Mutua adopt ways of conserving water, including the solar pump technology.
By pumping river water into storage tanks, farmer can practice drip irrigation, releasing water drip by drip through pipes lying on the surface of their land.
"Flooding takes 20 cubic metres of water per acre (8 cubic metres per hectare) while drip irrigation takes only two cubic metres per acre (0.8 cubic meters per hectare)," Munge said.
As more farmers adopt the new technology, there is hope that food can be produced even when conditions are harsh. Some farmers in the area now harvest runoff water, which is collected in underground reservoirs. The water can be used for irrigation during the dry season and pumped to gardens using the solar technology.
Mutua started using the solar-powered pump in 2010, and is eager to promote it.
“This has excited so many farmers, who are saving money to acquire theirs as well,” he said.
Source: Alertnet
Joseph Mutua has begun using a solar-powered pump to bring water from the nearby Nyamindi River to irrigate his export-bound food crops, which include French beans, baby corn and kale.
Solar panels standing on tall metal poles are connected to a pump immersed in the river, 200 metres away. A pipe carries water from the pump to a storage tank at the farm, and from there it is directed through pipes to irrigate Mutua’s farmland.
Farmers generally use diesel or petrol engines to pump water, but increases in the price of oil are making these pumps increasingly expensive to run.
"A farmer using a diesel pump spends up to 5,000 Kenyan shillings a day (about $60) to pump water to a medium piece of land," Mutua said.
By contrast, the solar pump, once purchased and installed, costs nothing to run. That enables farmers to spend their money on things like seeds instead of irrigation, Mutua said.
"For over a year now since I bought the solar pump, I have not had any maintenance. It has really saved me a lot of money," said Mutua.
NOT CHEAP, BUT CLEAN
The pump is not cheap. A solar pump with eight panels costs around 1.2 million shillings (about $14,000). Mutua started with the smallest possible unit – two solar panels – which, together with a tank and irrigation pipes, enabled him to irrigate 0.2 hectares (half an acre) of vegetables.
The initial cost was 170,000 shillings (about $1,900), which he paid out of his farming income and from savings.
In addition to its minimal running costs, the solar technology is environmentally clean. Unlike diesel engines, the solar-powered pump emits no pollution or climate changing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.
The pump also is helping to conserve water from the Nayamindi river. Low rainfall, likely caused by climatic change, is causing the river to dry up at certain times of year.
In drought-prone areas of Kenya, irrigation is widely used in farming. But uncontrolled irrigation methods, such as flooding furrows with water and letting it soak into the soil, are endangering water supplies.
"Every drop of water matters. Twenty years from now, if we don't keep our environment safe, we shall perish," warned Edwin Munge, a regional agronomist in Kirinyaga district.
Munge works with Kenya Horticultural Exporters, a local company to which Joseph Mutua sells his French beans. Munge is helping small-scale farmers such as Mutua adopt ways of conserving water, including the solar pump technology.
By pumping river water into storage tanks, farmer can practice drip irrigation, releasing water drip by drip through pipes lying on the surface of their land.
"Flooding takes 20 cubic metres of water per acre (8 cubic metres per hectare) while drip irrigation takes only two cubic metres per acre (0.8 cubic meters per hectare)," Munge said.
As more farmers adopt the new technology, there is hope that food can be produced even when conditions are harsh. Some farmers in the area now harvest runoff water, which is collected in underground reservoirs. The water can be used for irrigation during the dry season and pumped to gardens using the solar technology.
Mutua started using the solar-powered pump in 2010, and is eager to promote it.
“This has excited so many farmers, who are saving money to acquire theirs as well,” he said.
Source: Alertnet
Tuesday, June 28, 2011
Towards a low carbon industrial strategy for Nigeria (May 2011)
The Federal Government of Nigeria has set an ambitious growth target for the economy in the coming decade. Diversifying the economy away from the dominance of petroleum and expanding industrial production are important cornerstones of Vision 2020 – the country‟s economic development blueprint. Nigeria has over the years experienced de-industrialisation as a result of weak infrastructure, especially lack of access to power and financial resources to replace outmoded technologies. Most companies depend on expensive diesel to generate electricity to run their plants.
A low carbon industrial strategy is consistent with the County’s Vision 2020 plan to diversify and decarbonise the Nigerian economy. The strategy aims to achieve a structural transformation of the economy as a basis to launch industrial growth, create jobs as well as contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gases. However, the Vision 2020 fell short of identifying specific nuts and bolts of a low carbon industrial strategy. Low carbon development for Nigerian industries will require a switch from diesel to gas and renewable energy as well as the acquisition of more efficient technologies.
This paper identifies three priority sectors (energy, cement production and textile industries) where growth in low carbon technologies will make a difference and proposes a number of initial steps to expand low carbon industrial development in Nigeria.
However, the transition to high growth and low carbon development in all three identified priority industrial sectors is hampered by a number of factors, and these include the following
- Lack of infrastructure and high cost of industrial production. Power, water, roads and other vital infrastructure are in poor condition in Nigeria. As companies are made to provide these services for themselves, the cost of doing business remains high for them. As a result, companies experience cash squeeze and are often unable to make vital investments in technology renewal.
- Policy inconsistencies. Even though government has embarked on a number of stimulus packages for several industrial sectors, the implementation is often fraught with conflicting laws and regulations. As industrial associations recount various reversals in industrial strategies, the trust of investors on new government initiatives wane.
- No incentives for converting to low carbon energy technologies. Even though companies will benefit from fuel and technology switch programmes –allowing them to have more cost effective energy services, there are currently no incentives for converting to low carbon energy technologies for Nigerian industries.
- Inadequate inter-agency coordination. Industrial stakeholders are also concerned that government agencies often do not coordinate their policies – resulting in conflicting signals from a myriad of government agencies.
- Financing constraints. The Nigerian financial market is presently not deep enough to offer long-term loans at reasonable interest rates. This raises the cost of doing business and stymies efforts to invest in new technologies.
- Poor public awareness. Several leaders of industries are unaware of new efficient technologies, including domestic and international programmes that support their acquisition. As a result, only very few Nigerian companies have embarked on Clean Development Mechanism projects to meet the additional costs of cleaner technologies.
Noting the imperatives of growing the industrial sector along a low carbon pathway, the following recommendations have been proposed by senior leaders in government, industries, financial sector, international agencies and civil society:
- Set up a multi-stakeholder committee. This committee will include key stakeholders, such as government agencies, representatives of key industries, international agencies and civil society groups. The strategy will include a comprehensive package of incentives to stimulate the transition to more prosperous and efficient technology-driven industries in Nigeria.
- Build a political coalition. Stakeholders are concerned that agreed policies often are not followed up with effective implementation. A political platform is therefore needed to ensure that agreed green stimulus packages are fully implemented.
- Set up a green industrial fund. The Bank of Industry has set up a number of special purpose funds to address the challenges faced by Nigerian industries. The time has come for a clean technology fund to stimulate competitiveness of Nigerian industries, boost growth and contribute to emission reduction.
- Conduct clean technology research and advocacy. Both policymakers and industry leaders have significant gaps in their knowledge of the technology and financial requirements for low carbon industrial growth in priority sectors. An evidence-based advocacy programme will lead to greater awareness, stronger policies and better decisions by companies.
- Build international partnership. A number of Nigeria‟s bilateral partners and multi-lateral financial institutions have technology cooperation programmes that will benefit Nigeria‟s industries. These programmes include the Clean Development Mechanism under the UNFCCC. The government should promote these opportunities for technology and financial partnerships to support low carbon development in Nigerian industries.
Read the full paper ‘Towards a low carbon industrial strategy for Nigeria (May 2011) by Ewah O. Eleru et. al.from here
A low carbon industrial strategy is consistent with the County’s Vision 2020 plan to diversify and decarbonise the Nigerian economy. The strategy aims to achieve a structural transformation of the economy as a basis to launch industrial growth, create jobs as well as contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gases. However, the Vision 2020 fell short of identifying specific nuts and bolts of a low carbon industrial strategy. Low carbon development for Nigerian industries will require a switch from diesel to gas and renewable energy as well as the acquisition of more efficient technologies.
This paper identifies three priority sectors (energy, cement production and textile industries) where growth in low carbon technologies will make a difference and proposes a number of initial steps to expand low carbon industrial development in Nigeria.
However, the transition to high growth and low carbon development in all three identified priority industrial sectors is hampered by a number of factors, and these include the following
- Lack of infrastructure and high cost of industrial production. Power, water, roads and other vital infrastructure are in poor condition in Nigeria. As companies are made to provide these services for themselves, the cost of doing business remains high for them. As a result, companies experience cash squeeze and are often unable to make vital investments in technology renewal.
- Policy inconsistencies. Even though government has embarked on a number of stimulus packages for several industrial sectors, the implementation is often fraught with conflicting laws and regulations. As industrial associations recount various reversals in industrial strategies, the trust of investors on new government initiatives wane.
- No incentives for converting to low carbon energy technologies. Even though companies will benefit from fuel and technology switch programmes –allowing them to have more cost effective energy services, there are currently no incentives for converting to low carbon energy technologies for Nigerian industries.
- Inadequate inter-agency coordination. Industrial stakeholders are also concerned that government agencies often do not coordinate their policies – resulting in conflicting signals from a myriad of government agencies.
- Financing constraints. The Nigerian financial market is presently not deep enough to offer long-term loans at reasonable interest rates. This raises the cost of doing business and stymies efforts to invest in new technologies.
- Poor public awareness. Several leaders of industries are unaware of new efficient technologies, including domestic and international programmes that support their acquisition. As a result, only very few Nigerian companies have embarked on Clean Development Mechanism projects to meet the additional costs of cleaner technologies.
Noting the imperatives of growing the industrial sector along a low carbon pathway, the following recommendations have been proposed by senior leaders in government, industries, financial sector, international agencies and civil society:
- Set up a multi-stakeholder committee. This committee will include key stakeholders, such as government agencies, representatives of key industries, international agencies and civil society groups. The strategy will include a comprehensive package of incentives to stimulate the transition to more prosperous and efficient technology-driven industries in Nigeria.
- Build a political coalition. Stakeholders are concerned that agreed policies often are not followed up with effective implementation. A political platform is therefore needed to ensure that agreed green stimulus packages are fully implemented.
- Set up a green industrial fund. The Bank of Industry has set up a number of special purpose funds to address the challenges faced by Nigerian industries. The time has come for a clean technology fund to stimulate competitiveness of Nigerian industries, boost growth and contribute to emission reduction.
- Conduct clean technology research and advocacy. Both policymakers and industry leaders have significant gaps in their knowledge of the technology and financial requirements for low carbon industrial growth in priority sectors. An evidence-based advocacy programme will lead to greater awareness, stronger policies and better decisions by companies.
- Build international partnership. A number of Nigeria‟s bilateral partners and multi-lateral financial institutions have technology cooperation programmes that will benefit Nigeria‟s industries. These programmes include the Clean Development Mechanism under the UNFCCC. The government should promote these opportunities for technology and financial partnerships to support low carbon development in Nigerian industries.
Read the full paper ‘Towards a low carbon industrial strategy for Nigeria (May 2011) by Ewah O. Eleru et. al.from here
Monday, June 27, 2011
Going Beyond Jatropha: Can an Expanded Land and Feedstock Base Help India Meet its Ambitious Biodiesel Target?
A working paper titled "Going Beyond Jatropha: Can an Expanded Land and Feedstock Base Help India Meet its Ambitious Biodiesel Target?:" by Dr Promode Kant, Dr Wu Shuirong, Ms Swati Chaliha and Rajeshwar Jasrotia has been published by the Institute of Green Economy (IGREC).
The issues raised in this Working Paper related to production of biodiesel, though written with particular reference to India and China, have strong implications for developing countries like Africa where concern over 'land grabbing' by foreign companies seeking agricultural investment opportunities looms high.
...............
Increased use of biodiesel is an important part of India’s strategy for climate change mitigation. After its earlier plans to begin mandatory blending of fossil diesel with biodiesel by the year 2005 failed to take off due to inadequate production of biodiesel caused by near complete reliance on one species, Jatropha curcas, India decided to broadbase its feedstock and land choices in order to achieve 17% blending by year 2017.
This research work uses information on land and oil seed species available in the databases of relevant Indian institutions for identifying marginal lands unsuited for agriculture in various agro-climatic zones. After accounting for other existing uses and impracticality of use, the marginal lands actually available is estimated at 11.2 million hectares and thirteen species of trees bearing oil seeds suitable for planting on these lands have been identified. In addition, 20% of seeds of Sal (Shorea robusta) occurring gregariously over 10 million hectares of natural forests across the country, and of Rubber (Hevea brasilensis) over about 0.5 million hectares of large scale plantations in peninsular India, could be beneficially used for this purpose. But even after this resource base enlargement, the annual biodiesel yield in 2020 is estimated at only 8.83 million tons enabling about 8% blending by that year. Since China is also
intending to develop an ambitious biodiesel blending plan a limited comparison with China has been drawn.
Huge demands for biodiesel in these countries would necessitate large scale
imports unless there is a major technological breakthrough in lignocellulosic liquid biofuels. Experiences of past indicates that import of biodiesel in such large quantities could create severe adverse ecological and socio-economic consequences for the producing country, particularly if it happens to be a developing country with inadequate governance.
For ecologically sustainable imports of such large quantities of biodiesel India and China would need to coordinate with concerned international bodies like FAO to develop appropriate import strategies well in advance.
Read this full Working Paper: "Going Beyond Jatropha: Can an Expanded Land and Feedstock Base Help India Meet its Ambitious Biodiesel Target?:" by Dr Promode Kant, Dr Wu Shuirong, Ms Swati Chaliha and Rajeshwar Jasrotia from here
The issues raised in this Working Paper related to production of biodiesel, though written with particular reference to India and China, have strong implications for developing countries like Africa where concern over 'land grabbing' by foreign companies seeking agricultural investment opportunities looms high.
...............
Increased use of biodiesel is an important part of India’s strategy for climate change mitigation. After its earlier plans to begin mandatory blending of fossil diesel with biodiesel by the year 2005 failed to take off due to inadequate production of biodiesel caused by near complete reliance on one species, Jatropha curcas, India decided to broadbase its feedstock and land choices in order to achieve 17% blending by year 2017.
This research work uses information on land and oil seed species available in the databases of relevant Indian institutions for identifying marginal lands unsuited for agriculture in various agro-climatic zones. After accounting for other existing uses and impracticality of use, the marginal lands actually available is estimated at 11.2 million hectares and thirteen species of trees bearing oil seeds suitable for planting on these lands have been identified. In addition, 20% of seeds of Sal (Shorea robusta) occurring gregariously over 10 million hectares of natural forests across the country, and of Rubber (Hevea brasilensis) over about 0.5 million hectares of large scale plantations in peninsular India, could be beneficially used for this purpose. But even after this resource base enlargement, the annual biodiesel yield in 2020 is estimated at only 8.83 million tons enabling about 8% blending by that year. Since China is also
intending to develop an ambitious biodiesel blending plan a limited comparison with China has been drawn.
Huge demands for biodiesel in these countries would necessitate large scale
imports unless there is a major technological breakthrough in lignocellulosic liquid biofuels. Experiences of past indicates that import of biodiesel in such large quantities could create severe adverse ecological and socio-economic consequences for the producing country, particularly if it happens to be a developing country with inadequate governance.
For ecologically sustainable imports of such large quantities of biodiesel India and China would need to coordinate with concerned international bodies like FAO to develop appropriate import strategies well in advance.
Read this full Working Paper: "Going Beyond Jatropha: Can an Expanded Land and Feedstock Base Help India Meet its Ambitious Biodiesel Target?:" by Dr Promode Kant, Dr Wu Shuirong, Ms Swati Chaliha and Rajeshwar Jasrotia from here
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